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Scott S. Wiltermuth¹, Benoît Monin², and Rosalind M. Chow³

Abstract

The present studies examined whether the tendency to praise others for positive (i.e., moral) behaviors correlates with the tendency to condemn others for negative (i.e., immoral) behaviors. Across three studies, factor analyses revealed that these tendencies are orthogonal. The results refute the hypothesis that simply caring deeply about morality leads individuals to praise moral behaviors and condemn immoral ones. The research instead suggests that individuals who are most praising of positive behavior are not necessarily those who are most condemning of negative behavior, because orthogonal conceptions of morality influence each type of judgment. Although the tendency to condemn depends on how much one personally cares about morality (internalization), the tendency to praise seems to depend on one's public moral persona (symbolization).

Keywords

morality, moral judgment, moral evaluation, praise, condemnation, denigration

Who cares if you give to charity? Who likely thinks that you are moral for donating? If you have been embezzling money from the local soup kitchen, then anyone who cares about morality will likely condemn you. But if you made a significant donation to the soup kitchen, then people will likely differ wildly about whether that gift inherently makes you a moral person. We propose that whereas some see good deeds as proof of high moral standing, others base their judgments of moral character solely on whether someone transgresses, seeing good deeds as being irrelevant to judgments of moral character. This article examines whether the tendencies to condemn immoral behavior and praise moral behavior are distinct. It also explores the connection between these tendencies and known interpersonal differences in moral identity. It seeks, in essence, to determine whether caring deeply about morality leads people to condemn others for performing immoral behaviors and to praise others for performing moral ones.

Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Moral Centrality Hypothesis

We think it important to test whether the tendency to praise others for good deeds is distinct from the tendency to condemn others for bad deeds because the alternative unidimensional view of moral judgment is intuitively logical. In this view, people who really care about morality (i.e., who consider morality to be central to their identity) award not only great praise to those who behave morally but also great condemnation to those who behave immorally, whereas those who care less about morality are less effusive with their praise and condemnation.

As such, people who describe positive behavior as being moral should be the same people who describe negative behavior as being immoral. For example, in the moral chronicity model (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2005), "a person who has a moral identity or a moral character would be one for whom moral schemas are chronically accessible, readily primed and easily activated for processing information" (p. 969); therefore, that person is expected to reach equally quickly the conclusion that actors are "unselfish" (praise) or "disloyal" (condemnation; p. 977). Such a parsimonious one-dimensional approach to morality predicts extremity in judgments at both ends of the continuum for an individual who considers morality central to his or her identity. Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner's findings (2000) that people cleanse the discomfort of feeling morally deficient by engaging in positive moral behavior implies that people think of positive and negative morality on a single continuum. These models suggest that those who praise others most for good deeds should be the same who condemn others most for bad deeds. We refer to this idea as the moral centrality hypothesis.

¹ University of Southern California, Los Angeles

² Stanford University, Stanford, CA

³ Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA

Corresponding Author:

Scott S. Wiltermuth, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0808
Email: wiltermu@usc.edu

An Alternative View: The Independence Hypothesis

We test the alternative hypothesis that people's quickness to condemn says little about their quickness to praise. We base this proposal on classic work in person perception, on philosophical writings, and on recent advances in moral psychology.

Differential Impact of Positive and Negative Behavior in Person Perception

Negative behavior weighs heavier than positive behavior when perceivers form impressions of others (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Birnbaum, 1972, 1973; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989; Ybarra, 2001). People often discount positive behavior as being reflective of normative pressures and social desirability rather than true virtue (Ybarra, 2002; Ybarra & Stephan, 1996, 1999). Despite this focus on negative behavior, some individuals value positive behavior. Community activists praise elected officials for taking principled stands, and soldiers remember platoon members sacrificing by going well beyond the call of duty. Most individuals can easily muster moral exemplars who inspired them (Haidt, 2000). The cynicism about good deeds, as exposed by social psychologists, does not seem to be universally held. The model presented here casts light on individual differences in giving moral credit

Morality of Duty and Morality of Aspiration in Philosophy

Philosophers have distinguished between conceptions of morality that focus on the commitment of negative or antisocial behaviors and those that focus on positive or prosocial behaviors. Fuller (1969) distinguished between a morality of duty, focused on meeting minimally acceptable standards of behavior, and a morality of aspiration, focused on maximizing virtue. In a morality of duty, people who violate minimal standards are condemned, but those exceeding standards do not receive extra credit (Hamilton, Blumenfeld, & Kushler, 1988). In a morality of aspiration, one can be more moral by going beyond minimal standards. This distinction resonates with Fritzsche, Kessler, Mummendey, and Neumann's minimal versus maximal goal orientation (2009). It also resonates with Kant's distinction (1785/1993) between perfect duties, which are morally blameworthy if not fulfilled (e.g., feeding one's infant children), and imperfect duties, which are morally praiseworthy if fulfilled but not strictly necessary (e.g., cultivating one's talents for societal good). Thus, a focus on perfect duties corresponds to a focus on a morality of duty and a tendency to condemn others for negative behaviors, whereas a focus on imperfect duties corresponds to a focus on a morality of aspiration and a tendency to praise others for positive behaviors. The commitment of imperfect duties also corresponds to the Catholic concept of supererogation (Flescher, 1994; Urmson, 1958), which is conduct that is morally good but not strictly required. Such supererogatory conduct is morally meaningful in a

morality of aspiration but not in a strict morality of duty—although supererogation requires that there be a baseline level of moral duty that an individual's behavior transcends.

Prosocial and Antisocial Behaviors in Moral Psychology

Recent work in moral psychology supports the view that praise and condemnation may be orthogonal tendencies. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) distinguished between proscriptive and prescriptive morality as two distinct sides of moral regulation. They showed, for example, that engaging in proscribed behavior is condemned more than not engaging in proscribed behavior and that engaging in prescribed behavior is praised more than not engaging in proscribed behavior. Krueger, Hicks, and McGue (2001) showed that altruism and antisocial behavior are uncorrelated tendencies. Although no study has directly examined the relation between positive and negative moral judgments, a number of studies have suggested that pro- and antisocial tendencies may not be at opposite ends of a continuum (e.g., Axelrod, Widiger, Trull, & Corbitt, 1997; Harris, Rushton, Hampson, & Jackson, 1996; Levenson, 1990; McCord, 1992, 1989; for counterexamples, see Eron & Huesmann, 1984; Goma-i-Freixanet, 1995).

Based on work in person perception, philosophy, and moral psychology, our proposal is that distinct theories of moral character may lead individuals to be differentially influenced by good and bad deeds when judging others. In particular, the extent to which one condemns bad deeds may not be closely related to the extent to which one praises good deeds—an idea that we refer to as the independence hypothesis.

Overview of Studies

We conducted three studies to test the independence hypothesis. Studies 1 and 2 used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to analyze the structure of morality ratings of actors in hypothetical vignettes. Study 3 extended this analysis to show that ratings of real-world exemplars and the trait words that people use to describe them reflect these two independent conceptions of morality. To explore individual factors predicting how much one praises or condemns others, we included in all studies both the Internalization and Symbolization subscales of Aquino and Reed's Moral Identity Scale (2002). Because we did not have strong a priori predictions, we defer further description of these scales to the general discussion. The main goal of these studies was to demonstrate the orthogonality of praise and condemnation in moral judgment, which we define here as the process of monitoring and evaluating interactions among unrelated others according to broadly applicable standards of behavior (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2008).

Study 1

We examined whether those who condemn others most severely for bad deeds are most extreme in praising others for good

Table 1. Study 1: Loadings in Factor Analyses—Ratings of Negative, Positive Proactive, and Positive Inhibitive Behaviors

Category	Virtue	Vignette	Sample 1 exploratory				Sample 2 confirmatory	
			Fac 1	Fac 2	Fac 3	Fac 4	Fac 1	Fac 2
Negative	Honest	Kevin regularly lies to his friends and his colleagues if he stands to gain from doing so.	0.42	0.78	-0.03	-0.04		0.80
	Helpful/kind	Deanna helps no one but herself.	0.17	0.85	0.16	0.00		0.85
	Caring/compassionate	Craig takes advantage of others when they are in distress.	0.33	0.75	0.04	-0.11		0.27
	Fair	Gary gives male employees more opportunities for advancement than he does female employees.	0.22	0.87	-0.10	0.02		0.64
	Hardworking	Todd shirks his duties at work, slacking and forcing others to cover for him.	0.19	0.90	-0.03	-0.10		0.85
	Generous	Lisa is tight-fisted, giving neither her money nor her time to anyone in need.	0.27	0.82	0.15	0.00		0.65
	Friendly	Anna is generally cold and unfriendly to others.	0.21	0.80	0.05	0.23		0.69
Inhibitive	Honest	Despite many attempts from interested women to lead him astray, Bill has never cheated on his wife in 34 years of marriage.	0.58	-0.29	-0.49	0.15		0.62
	Helpful/kind	Paul will not turn his back on a friend who requests a favor.	0.65	-0.09	-0.49	-0.17		0.70
	Caring/compassionate	Janet does not believe in violence and would not hurt a fly.	0.71	-0.10	-0.12	-0.15		0.67
	Fair	Marshall will not shortchange others.	0.65	-0.18	0.04	0.38		0.62
	Hardworking	Marie will not slack off at work if doing so affects others.	0.70	-0.24	-0.07	0.45		0.60
	Generous	Ashley is willing to share what she has as long as everyone else is willing to share what they have.	0.48	0.26	-0.12	0.52	0.36	
	Friendly	Ron is never unfriendly.	0.64	0.04	-0.01	-0.45		0.54
Proactive	Honest	Zelda tells cashiers if she receives too much change back.	0.60	-0.24	0.26	-0.22		0.74
	Helpful/kind	Curtis helps his neighbors by working on several community organizations.	0.70	-0.27	0.46	-0.03		0.72
	Caring/compassionate	Robert volunteers in a soup kitchen.	0.72	-0.32	0.25	0.03		0.77
	Fair	Mia campaigns for equal rights for all people.	0.65	-0.23	0.23	0.09		0.63
	Hardworking	Kim gives her utmost effort whenever she commits to performing a task.	0.74	-0.14	-0.36	-0.02		0.81
	Generous	Jeffrey gives generously to charities working to eradicate hunger.	0.72	-0.25	0.53	-0.02		0.77
	Friendly	Leon goes out of his way to be friendly with others.	0.73	-0.08	-0.24	-0.38		0.77

Bold indicates highest loadings in each row.

deeds. We were interested in how people differ in judging people who do not perform bad deeds. Two possibilities arise: First, that one does not cheat or lie could impress people who care about cheating or lying; second, not doing bad things (following the attribution literature) may be seen as being meaningful only to people who put credence in good deeds. To explore this question, we presented participants with one type of negative behavior but two types of positive behaviors, proactive and inhibitive. We tested whether people who “always tell the truth” (proactive morality) are judged differently from those who “never lie” (inhibitive morality). This study includes two samples, thereby enabling us to use both EFA and CFA. To determine if people who regard morality to be central to their

identity are more extreme in their praise, denigration, or both, we included Aquino and Reed’s Moral Identity Scale (2002).

Method: Participants and Procedure

In Sample 1, undergraduates ($n = 114$, 60% female, M age = 20 years) from a private university on the West Coast received \$7 to rate the morality of 21 actors in one-sentence vignettes (see Table 1): 7 depicting proactive positive behavior ($\alpha = .85$), 7 depicting negative behavior ($\alpha = .94$), and 7 depicting inhibitive behavior (not performing negative behavior; $\alpha = .78$). Each category of behavior included one vignette related to each of the seven traits or trait pairs

Table 2. Studies 1 and 2: Model Fit Statistics

	Study 1 model fit statistics		Study 2 model fit statistics	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Factors	1	2	1	2
χ^2	518.1**	299.7**	702.6**	431.2**
Df	189	189	252	252
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
χ^2/DF	2.74	1.59	2.79	1.71
GFI	0.56	0.76	0.59	0.76
GFI-hat	0.84	0.94	0.86	0.94
CFI	0.61	0.86	0.66	0.86
RMSEA	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.08
Lower 90% CI	0.13	0.07	0.12	0.07
Upper 90% CI	0.16	0.10	0.14	0.09
SRMR	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.09
Change in χ^2		-218.4**		-271.4**

GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual.

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

that Aquino and Reed (2002) identified being as related to morality. We asked participants, “How moral is [the vignette character] for acting like this?” and we instructed them to “rate the morality from -10 (*extremely immoral*) to 10 (*extremely moral*).”

Results

Contrary to the moral centrality hypothesis and consistent with the independence hypothesis, ratings of immoral behaviors ($M = -3.32, SD = 3.94$) did not significantly correlate with either proactive positive behaviors ($M = 6.69, SD = 2.00; r = .01, p = .93$) or inhibitive behaviors ($M = 5.60, SD = 2.17; r = .13, p = .16$). Proactive positive behaviors correlated strongly with ratings of inhibitive behaviors ($M = 6.77, SD = 2.13; r = .76, p = .01$). A principal component analysis using a varimax rotation revealed that all vignettes depicting proactive positive behavior and inhibitive behavior loaded highly on the first factor but not on the second factor. As Table 1 displays, vignettes depicting negative behavior loaded on the second factor but not the first. The factors respectively explained 32% and 27% of the variance.

We performed CFA on a second sample, comprising online participants ($n = 96, 68\%$ female, M age = 34 years). Tables 1 and 2 display the results of these analyses. A structure with two uncorrelated factors based on the first two dimensions identified in the EFA (Model 2) provided a significantly better fit to the data than did a one-factor structure (Model 1), $\chi^2(1) = 218.4, p < .01$. The two-factor model produced a reasonable, albeit a not particularly strong, fit to the model according to the root mean square error of approximation, comparative fit index, chi-square/degrees of freedom, and Steiger’s goodness

of fit index (1990), or gamma hat statistic, which accounts for the fact that the goodness of fit index is negatively biased when degrees of freedom are large relative to the sample size.

Using the three- and four-factor structures generated by the EFA produced negative error variances and did not improve the fit of the model. Allowing factors in the two-factor model to correlate did not improve the fit of the model. Mean ratings of immoral behaviors ($M = -3.60, SD = 3.73$) were uncorrelated with mean ratings of proactive behaviors ($M = 7.66, SD = 2.08; r = -.11, p = .30$) and inhibitive behaviors ($M = 6.77, SD = 2.13; r = .01, p = .97$). Mean ratings of proactive and inhibitive behaviors were highly correlated ($r = .83, p < .01$).

Moral Identity as a Predictor of Praise and Blame

Participants complete the Internalization subscale ($\alpha = .70$) and Symbolization subscale ($\alpha = .91; r = .21, p > .05$, with Internalization) of Aquino and Reed’s Moral Identity Scale (2002; see the General Discussion section for a description of subscales). We controlled for known sources of variation in moral judgment, including gender (Gilligan, 1977; Reimer, 1984), years of education (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), religiosity (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*), and conservatism (1 = *extremely liberal*, 7 = *extremely conservative*). As shown later, symbolization predicted ratings of positive behaviors only; in contrast, internalization significantly predicted ratings of negative behaviors only. Men rated negative behaviors more negatively, and years of education attenuated ratings of positive behavior.

Discussion

Factor analyses showed that ratings of positive and negative behaviors loaded on separate factors. The results suggest that the tendency to praise others for positive behaviors is orthogonal to the tendency to condemn others for negative behaviors. In examining whether moral centrality predicted either praise or condemnation, we found that distinct elements of Aquino and Reed’s measure of moral identity (2002) predicted each. Specifically, symbolization predicted praise, and internalization predicted condemnation. These results too suggest that there may be distinct tendencies to praise and condemn.

We should acknowledge that model fit of the two-factor model, as measured by the standardized root mean square residual, the comparative fit index, and the root mean square error of approximation, are not particularly strong relative to commonly accepted thresholds (for discussion of thresholds for adequate and good fits, see Bentler, 1990; Steiger, 1990). We believe that these statistics were not particularly high, in large part, because our models did not account for elevated correlations between closely related items expressing proactive behaviors (e.g., “always telling the truth”) and inhibitive behaviors (e.g., “never lying”) reflecting the same moral traits. To test the robustness of our findings, we conducted a second CFA, in Study 2.

Study 2

In Study 2, we used vignettes illustrating a broader set of moral issues, to test the generality of the finding that the tendency to praise is orthogonal to the tendency to condemn. We also introduced two additional scales: one that directly assesses the importance of morality as a criterion for self-worth and one that measures the extent to which individuals use morality as an organizing dimension of social perception.

Method: Participants, Procedures, and Measures

Participants in a Web-based research pool completed the survey ($n = 119$, 65% female, M age = 34 years). All participants rated the morality exhibited in 24 vignettes, which included a broader sample of moral issues: sexual propriety, bodily purity (drugs), civic duty, the environment, women's rights, caring for less privileged others, honesty, and helping: 8 vignettes depicted proactive positive behavior ($\alpha = .85$), 8 depicted negative behavior ($\alpha = .94$), and 8 depicted inhibitive behavior ($\alpha = .73$). Vignette characters were rated on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (*extremely immoral*) to 10 (*extremely moral*).

Participants also completed the Internalization subscale ($\alpha = .65$) and Symbolization subscale ($\alpha = .79$; $r = .10$, $p = .29$, with Internalization) of Aquino and Reed's instrument (2002) and the CSW-Virtue subscale ($\alpha = .87$) of Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, and Bouvrette's Contingency of Self-Worth Scale (2003). Additionally, they completed Lapsley and Narvaez's Chronicity of Morality Scale (2004), which assesses the extent to which individuals view their social world through the lens of morality: Individuals think of someone they like, someone they dislike, someone they avoid, and two people they seek out. They list six characteristics of each person. To be classified as moral chronics, participants needed to list three or more prototypical moral characteristics for at least three of the five targets.

Results

Ratings of immoral behaviors ($M = -2.23$, $SD = 3.85$) did not significantly correlate with either proactive positive behaviors ($M = 7.39$, $SD = 1.97$; $r = .15$, $p = .12$) or inhibitive behaviors ($M = 7.36$, $SD = 2.41$; $r = .01$, $p = .91$). Proactive positive behaviors correlated strongly with mean ratings of inhibitive behaviors ($M = 6.77$, $SD = 2.13$; $r = .80$, $p = .01$). CFA, as displayed in Table 2, revealed that a model with one factor predicting ratings of positive and inhibitive behaviors and another uncorrelated factor predicting ratings of immoral behaviors (Model 4) provided a better fit than that of a one-factor model (Model 3; $\chi^2(1) = 271.4$). The two-factor model produced a reasonable fit to the model according to the root mean square error of approximation, comparative fit index, chi-square/degrees of freedom, and Steiger's goodness of fit index (gamma hat statistic; 1990). Allowing the two factors to correlate did not improve the fit of the model, $\chi^2(1) = .466$, $p = .29$.

As Table 3 displays, symbolization again positively predicted ratings of positive but not negative behavior, controlling for other measures of centrality of morality to the self. Internalization again significantly predicted ratings of negative behavior only. Men rated negative behaviors more negatively, and years of education attenuated ratings of positive behavior. As shown in Table 4, people who were moral chronics rated negative behaviors as being more immoral, but they did not rate positive behavior as being more moral. Moral chronicity did not correlate significantly with either internalization or symbolization. The contingencies of the Contingencies of Self-Worth-Virtue subscale, which correlated with internalization but not symbolization, did not predict ratings of positive or negative behaviors.

Discussion

Based on vignettes addressing a wider range of values, Study 2 provided more support for the independence hypothesis than for the moral centrality hypothesis. No one scale significantly correlated with extremity of praise and denigration. Rather, Aquino and Reed's Internalization subscale (from their Moral Identity Scale; 2002) and Lapsley and Narvaez's measure of moral chronicity (2004) each predicted ratings of negative behaviors, whereas Aquino and Reed's Symbolization subscale predicted ratings of positive behaviors.

Study 3

In Study 3, we test whether the tendency to praise real-world exemplars of positive morality (e.g., the firefighters who entered the World Trade Center on September 11) is distinct from the tendency to condemn real-world exemplars of immorality (e.g., those convicted of fraud in the Enron case). We also test whether differences in conceptions of morality predict individuals' choice of trait words to describe these real-world actors.

Method: Participants and Procedure

Participants ($n = 112$, 77% female, M age = 34 years) in a Web-based research pool received a \$7 gift certificate for completing the study. After completing the Internalization subscale ($\alpha = .76$) and Symbolization subscale ($\alpha = .83$), participants completed the Lapsley and Narvaez measure of moral chronicity (2004) and Crocker and colleagues' CSW-Virtue subscale (2003; $\alpha = .86$). They then rated the morality of individuals recently discussed in the news, selecting adjectives from a list of 11 that they believed accurately described these persons. The individuals had recently made headlines for either a positive act ($\alpha = .81$) or an immoral act ($\alpha = .88$; see Table 5). The 11 adjectives that participants viewed connoted morality (*admirable*, *noble*, *heroic*, *saintly*), immorality (*evil*, *cowardly*, *sleazy*, *unprincipled*), or neither (*intelligent*, *determined*, *misguided*). Participants also had the option to choose *none of the above*.

Table 3. Regression Equations for Studies 1-3

	Rating of positive behaviors			Rating of negative behaviors		
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
Internal moral identity	0.20 (0.21)	0.25 (0.29)	0.18 (0.26)	-1.55 (0.41)**	-1.14 (0.54)*	-1.79 (0.46)**
Symbolic moral identity	0.59 (0.15)**	0.44 (0.17)*	0.60 (0.17)**	0.19 (0.32)	0.22 (0.32)	0.04 (0.29)
Education	-0.17 (0.07)*	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.07)	0.13 (0.15)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.13)
Male	0.02 (0.42)	-1.08 (0.44)*	-0.16 (0.51)	-2.34 (0.82)**	-0.21 (0.81)	-1.26 (0.89)
Conservatism	0.12 (0.17)	0.15 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.35)	0.25 (0.32)	0.11 (0.32)
Religious strength	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.13 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.21)	0.17 (0.22)
CSW-Virtue		-0.09 (0.20)	-0.20 (0.27)		0.14 (0.37)	0.48 (0.48)
Moral chronicity		0.22 (0.47)	-0.21 (0.34)		-1.98 (0.88)*	-1.07 (0.60)
Intercept	3.68 (1.45)**	4.48 (1.85)**	5.77 (2.22)*	5.59 (2.86)*	5.41 (3.46)	1.81 (3.92)

* $p < .05$.
 ** $p < .01$.

Table 4. Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Vignette Variables

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 Moral Identity	5.43	0.73	–									
2 Internalization	6.35	0.71	0.57**	–								
3 Symbolization	4.51	1.21	0.88**	0.10	–							
4 Education	3.13	2.06	0.07	0.08	0.04	–						
5 Female	0.65	0.48	-0.01	0.10	-0.07	-0.12	–					
6 Religious Strength	3.97	1.99	0.34**	0.16	0.32**	0.03	0.05	–				
7 Conservatism	3.81	1.27	0.15	0.16	0.09	0.03	-0.18	0.42**	–			
8 CSW—Virtue	5.54	1.09	0.32**	0.36**	0.18	0.08	0.25	0.26	0.10	–		
9 Moral Chronicity	0.22	0.41	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.09	-0.04	0.00	0.03	-0.01	–	
10 Positive Behavior Rating	7.38	2.08	0.24**	0.14	0.21*	-0.04	0.18*	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.10	–
11 Negative Behavior Rating	-2.23	3.85	-0.11	-0.22*	-0.01	-0.07	-0.01	-0.11	-0.03	-0.11	-0.22*	0.07

**Correlation is significant at the $p = .01$ level (two-tailed).
 *Correlation is significant at the $p = .05$ level (two-tailed).

Results

Numerical ratings. Ratings of negative behaviors ($M = -5.79$, $SD = 3.94$) did not significantly correlate with those of positive behaviors ($M = 7.67$, $SD = 2.14$; $r = -.14$, $p = .15$). We also conducted a principal component analysis using varimax rotation to see if the patterns emerging from ratings of real-life actors would match those emerging from the vignettes of hypothetical behavior. Two principal factors explained 36% and 27% of the variance. As Table 5 displays, ratings of real-world actors committing positive actions loaded highly on the first factor but not the second. Ratings of real-world actors committing negative actions loaded highly on only the second factor.

Symbolization again predicted ratings of positive actors only (see Table 3), whereas internalization predicted ratings of negative actors only. Neither moral chronicity nor the CSW-Virtue subscale predicted rating of positive actors or condemnation for negative actors.

Adjective use. The correlation between symbolization and high praise for positive behavior carried over into the words that people chose to describe positive actions. We counted the

frequency with which people rating the positive actors chose to check the adjectives *heroic* or *saintly*, which are associated with high levels of moral praise (Flescher, 1994; Urmson, 1958). People higher on symbolization used the adjectives *heroic* or *saintly* marginally more frequently to describe moral actors, $\beta = .17$, $t(109) = 1.86$, $p = .07$, whereas internalization had no effect, $p > .41$. The frequency of adjectives typically associated with lower levels of moral praise (*admirable* and *noble*) did not significantly correlate with symbolization.

People scoring high on internalization were more condemnatory in the labels they used to characterize the negative exemplars. They more frequently used the adjectives *sleazy*, *cowardly*, and *unprincipled*, $\beta = 0.24$, $t(109) = 2.54$, $p = .02$, to describe immoral actors. They were not more likely to use *evil*, $p > .45$, to describe immoral actors. Symbolization did not predict the number of times that participants selected these adjectives.

Discussion

Based on real-world exemplars, Study 3 demonstrated the orthogonality of praise and condemnation. As before, the Symbolization subscale predicted praise, whereas the

Table 5. Study 3: Factor Loadings in an Exploratory Factor Analysis—Ratings of Negative and Positive Figures in the News

Category: Real-life figures	Factor 1	Factor 2
Negative		
The hijackers commanding the planes that destroyed the two towers of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001	.80	.27
Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy in the Enron case	.84	.34
Marketing executives of major tobacco companies	.67	.25
Mark Foley, the former congressman who engaged in cybersex with teenage interns	.77	.25
Computer hackers who design and distribute harmful computer viruses	.83	.22
Positive		
The volunteers who helped clean up New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina	-.35	.73
Warren Buffett, who donated over 85% of his personal wealth (\$36 billion) to five charitable foundations	-.37	.70
Christopher Reeve, who campaigned diligently for funding for spinal cord research	-.36	.65
Nurses who take care of the terminally ill	-.33	.74

Bold indicates highest loading per row.

Internalization subscale predicted condemnation. Consistent with these findings, the use of extreme praise words was correlated with symbolization but not internalization, and the use of condemnatory adjectives was predicted by internalization but not symbolization.

General Discussion

Our studies demonstrate that the extent to which one is impressed with good deeds is unconnected to the harshness with which one condemns bad ones. Across three studies, judgments of positive and negative behaviors were, at best, weakly correlated. Moreover, factor analyses revealed that judgments of positive and negative behaviors loaded onto distinct and uncorrelated factors.

These findings are at the confluence of multiple research traditions and thus contribute to several literatures. The simplest yet perhaps most important contribution is that moral psychologists need to more finely distinguish the processes involved in the moral judgment of positive and negative behaviors. Whereas judgments of positive and negative behaviors are often presented in the literature as if they were the two ends of the same continuum, our data suggest that the two types of judgment are largely unrelated. This finding is consistent with Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson's call (1997) for psychologists to be more sensitive to distinguish judgment processes involving positive and negative behaviors and recent work distinguishing proscriptive and prescriptive moralities (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009; Folger, *in press*). A second major contribution from our findings is that the tendency to praise not engaging in negative behavior is closely related to the tendency to praise positive behavior and not to the tendency to condemn negative behavior. Our findings also qualify the characterization of attribution schemas in the literature, typically suggesting that people pay little attention to positive behavior when estimating disposition and character. Our data suggest that people differ in the extent to which they perceive good deeds as being meaningful and that some individuals in fact perceive good deeds to be reflective of morality.

Internalization and Symbolization

Although not predicted, additional support for the independence hypothesis came from the consistent and specific correlations between the subscales of Aquino and Reed's moral identity instrument (2002) and the two types of moral judgments (see Table 3). In all studies, internalization was associated with condemnation for negative behavior, whereas symbolization was associated with praise for positive behavior. The Internalization subscale assesses the private importance of moral identity (see the significant correlation with the CSW-Virtue subscale in Study 2; Crocker et al., 2003), and its association with condemnation reflects that individuals who personally care about being moral are more critical of the moral failings of others. Interestingly, Narvaez and colleagues' moral chronicity measure (2005) was uncorrelated with internalization in Study 2, but it still independently predicted condemnation, suggesting that seeing the world in moral terms makes one more judgmental of others' sins. In contrast, the Symbolization subscale was designed to capture the public facet of moral identity. That individuals low on symbolization did not give much moral credit to do-gooders suggests that the symbolization may negatively correlate with the degree of cynicism that people have toward the positive acts of others. So, although personally caring about being moral (internalization) predicts condemning others for their negative behaviors, it takes some faith in the meaningfulness of public moral displays (symbolization) to praise others for their positive behavior. The orthogonality of these subscales suggests that any combination of the two is conceivable. Our data cast a new light on the Moral Identity Scale and invite further research on the role of cynicism in symbolization.

Conclusion

Our results enable us to refute the assumption that simply caring deeply about morality leads individuals to praise moral behaviors and condemn immoral ones. We found instead that the tendency to praise good deeds (a morality of aspiration)

is uncorrelated with the tendency to condemn sins (a morality of duty). Not only did we demonstrate this predicted independence in our data, but we also discovered that existing scales of moral identity are good predictors of these two tendencies. It is crucial to identify these dimensions of character judgment to accurately model moral reactions to negative and positive behaviors—to predict who will care when you lie and who will care when you give to charity.

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Bios

Scott S. Wiltermuth is an assistant professor of management and organizations at the University of Southern California. His research explores how individuals behave and perform in groups and dyads. He investigates specifically how interpersonal dynamics, such as dominance, submissiveness, and physical synchrony, affect coordination. He also researches how people view and judge others' morality. Scott has published papers in *Academy of Management Journal* and *Psychological Science*.

Benoît Monin is an associate professor of organizational behavior and psychology at Stanford University, and an associate editor of the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. His research investigates the role of self-image in everyday morality, as reflected for example in the liberating role of moral credentials and the resentment of moral rebels.

Rosalind M. Chow is an assistant professor of organizational behavior and theory at Carnegie Mellon University. Her research interests include perceptions of justice, the psychological experience of power and dominance, and pro-social behavior. Rosalind has published in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* and the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*.