Inequality Frames
When you think about social inequalities, do you think about it as one group having more? Or as one group having less?
What impact does this small change in wording have on our experiences of and responses to inequality?
Relevant Publications
Chronic frames of social inequality: How mainstream media frame race, gender, and wealth inequality.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2022, with S. Jun, A. M. van der Veen, and E. Bleich
How social inequality is described—as advantage or disadvantage—critically shapes individuals’ responses to it. As such, it is important to document how people, in fact, choose to describe inequality. Using multiple methods and research contexts, we find that race and gender inequalities are chronically described as subordinate groups’ disadvantages, whereas wealth inequality is chronically described using no frame or as the dominant group’s advantage. Moreover, these differences in chronic frames are related to the perceived legitimacy of the inequality domain. The presence of such chronic frames and their association with perceived legitimacy may be mechanisms underlying the systematic inattention to White individuals’ and men’s advantages, and the disadvantages of the working class.
The effect of inequality frames on redistributive income policy support.
Psychological Science, 2012, with J. Galak
Although most Americans agree that wealth inequality is a pressing problem, opposition to redistributive income policies remains high, particularly among conservatives. We explore the possibility that this opposition is influenced by how income inequality is discussed: as either the poor making less than the rich or the rich making more than the poor. We find that conservatism predicted opposition to redistributive income policies when participants were told that the poor make less, but that this opposition was attenuated when participants were told that the rich make more. This effect was driven by participants’ attributions for wealth.
Paying for positive group-esteem: How inequity frames affect Whites' responses to redistributive policies.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2012, with B. S. Lowery, E. D. Knowles, and M. M. Unzueta
This article finds that, when faced with racial inequity framed as White advantage, Whites desire to think well of their racial group increases their support for policies perceived to harm Whites. Across 4 studies, the article provides evidence that (a) relative to minority disadvantage, White advantage increases Whites’ support for policies perceived to reduce their group’s economic opportunities, but does not increase support for policies perceived to increase minority opportunities; and (b) the effect of White advantage on Whites’ esteem for their ingroup drives the effect of inequity frame on support for policies perceived to reduce Whites’ opportunities.
Taking from those that have more and giving to those that have less: How inequity frames affect corrections for inequity.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009, with B. S. Lowery and J. Randall-Crosby
Most theories of inequity focus on relative inequity. In contrast, this paper provides evidence that individuals infer what people should have (i.e. an absolute standard) from the way inequity is described. In the reported experiment, participants give more to a subordinate actor when inequity is described in terms of “less than” rather than “more than,” and take more from a dominant actor when inequity is described in terms of “more than” rather than “less than,” even though the magnitude of inequity is constant. Mediational analyses suggest that these differences are driven by changes in individuals’ perceptions of what the actors should have (i.e. the standard). We conclude by discussing the implications for motivated perceptions of inequity and redistributive policy attitudes.
The two faces of dominance: The differential effect of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority on group identification and group-esteem.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2008, with B. S. Lowery and E. D. Knowles
The present paper provides evidence that dominant-group members distinguish dominance framed as ingroup superiority from dominance framed as outgroup inferiority, and that ingroup superiority enhances esteem for, and thus identification with, the group more than outgroup inferiority. In Experiment 1, Democrats report higher levels of party identification after being told that Democrats won an election than after being told that Republicans lost the election. These effects are attenuated among dominant group members whose values are in conflict with how dominance was achieved. In Experiments 2a and 2b, unearned dominance framed as ingroup superiority resulted in higher levels of White identification than unearned dominance framed as outgroup inferiority among Whites who did not value meritocracy. In contrast, Whites who valued meritocracy did not increase their levels of identification with the group. In Experiment 2b, this interactive effect on racial identification was mediated by esteem for the group.